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EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF THE 
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
LAUREN ANN ROSS† 
ABSTRACT 
  Because the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) can be used to 
regulate conduct that has but a tangential connection to the United 
States, the statute exemplifies the potential difficulties of applying U.S. 
criminal law extraterritorially. The FCPA’s heightened enforcement 
environment and the norm of deferred-prosecution agreements that 
settle FCPA charges out of court combine to increase the probability 
that a foreign individual or firm will be prosecuted under the FCPA 
for bribery that occurred in and affected a foreign country. This Note 
proposes drawing from the presumption against extraterritoriality, a 
concept from foreign relations law, to find a reasonable limit to the 
territorial provision of the FCPA, which applies to foreign individuals 
and foreign companies that are not listed as issuers in the United 
States. 
INTRODUCTION 
JGC Corporation (JGC), a construction and engineering firm 
headquartered in Japan, entered into a deferred-prosecution 
agreement with the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) on 
April 6, 2011.1 As part of the agreement, JGC agreed to pay a fine of 
more than $200 million and to waive certain rights as a criminal 
defendant in the United States in exchange for a deferred-
prosecution agreement that would most likely lead to 
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 1. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 4:11-cr-00260 
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/jgc-corp/
04-6-11jgc-corp-dpa.pdf. 
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nonprosecution.2 The proceedings in the Southern District of Texas 
stemmed from an alleged violation of U.S. law that began in Europe 
and occurred in Nigeria.3 The U.S. law at issue was the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA),4 which criminalizes bribery of foreign 
officials for commercial gain. 
In the affair, JGC and three joint-venture partners used 
European and Asian agents to pay bribes to obtain construction 
contracts for a project in Nigeria (the Bonny Island Project).5 One of 
the joint-venture partners, Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc. (KBR), 
corresponded regarding the Bonny Island Project through facsimiles 
and e-mails from its Houston, Texas, headquarters,6 and funds were 
electronically routed through New York when agents wired money 
from Dutch to Swiss bank accounts.7 Once the Bonny Island Project 
bribery came to light, the DOJ initiated investigations of all of the 
joint-venture partners and involved individuals.8 JGC initially refused 
 
 2. Id. at 2. The agreement required JGC to pay a $218.8 million penalty, take remedial 
measures to improve its corporate-compliance program, and cooperate in ongoing DOJ 
investigations. Id. at 3–8. Nonprosecution agreements allow prosecutors to file charges and then 
put those charges on hold for a period of time while exacting fines and instituting internal 
compliance programs. Eugene Illovsky, Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements: The 
Brewing Debate, CRIM. JUSTICE, Summer 2006, at 36, 36. There is disagreement about the 
fairness and efficacy of deferred-prosecution and nonprosecution agreements for corporate 
compliance. See, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 
859–61 (2007) (arguing that deferred-prosecution agreements are an effective means of 
achieving reform within corporations but that they may lead to prosecutorial overreaching); 
Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 312–13 (2007) (discussing the “gap in the constitutional protections 
afforded those individual defendants” that are subject to deferred-prosecution agreements). 
 3. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, Attachment A at 10–17. 
 4. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2006 & Supp. IV 
2011). 
 5. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, Attachment A at 2, 7. 
 6. Id. Attachment A at 8, 10, 16. 
 7. Id. Attachment A at 10. 
 8. E.g., id. at 1; Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Tesler, No. 4:09-cr-00098 (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 11, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/tesler/tesler_
plea_agmt.pdf; Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 1, United States v. Snamprogetti Neth. 
B.V., No. 4:10-cr-00460 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/
fraud/fcpa/cases/snamprogetti/07-07-10snamprogetti-dpa.pdf; Deferred Prosecution Agreement 
at 1, United States v. Technip S.A., No. 4:10-cr-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/technip-sa/06-28-10-technip-agreement.pdf; 
Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. 4:09-cr-00071 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/kelloggb/02-11-
09kbr-plea-agree.pdf; Plea Agreement at 1, United States v. Stanley, No. 4:08-cr-00597 (S.D. 
Tex. Sept. 3, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/stanleya/09-03-
08stanley-plea-agree.pdf. 
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to cooperate because it felt that the United States lacked jurisdiction,9 
but the Japanese company later acquiesced and signed the offered 
agreement.10 Each entity that was implicated eventually signed a 
deferred-prosecution or plea agreement with the government;11 in 
total, the DOJ collected more than $1.5 billion in fines from the 
companies that participated in the Bonny Island Project bribery.12 
How was a Japanese company haled into court in Texas for 
conduct—bribing foreign officials to obtain business—that was 
initiated in Europe, the effects of which were felt in Africa, and that 
had only a tangential connection to the United States? The DOJ 
relied on a combination of two U.S. connections to establish U.S. 
jurisdiction: (1) that JGC possessed vicarious liability through agency 
relationships with an American joint-venture partner,13 and (2) that 
wire transfers through New York banks served as a territorial act in 
furtherance of the crime.14 To understand the potential significance of 
these connections, it is necessary to understand the FCPA’s 
 
 9. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, at 3. 
 10. Id. at 1, 3. 
 11. See supra note 8. 
 12. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, JGC Corp. Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Investigation and Agrees To Pay a $218.8 Million Criminal Penalty (Apr. 6, 2011), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/April/11-crm-431.html. 
 13. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, Attachment A at 8 (“Officers, 
employees, and agents of JGC . . . and their co-conspirators willfully used the mails and means 
and instrumentalities of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of the authorization, 
promise, and payment of bribes to Nigerian government officials pursuant to the scheme. 
Stanley, other officers, employees, and agents of KBR, and other co-conspirators committed 
acts in furtherance of the scheme in Houston, Texas, and elsewhere in the United States.”). 
Joint-venture partners are considered agents of one another and can thus be held liable for the 
FCPA violations of another partner. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES 
ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL NORMS 65 (2d ed. 2010). This joint liability extends from 
the common comparison of joint ventures to partnerships. See, e.g., In re Groff, 898 F.2d 1475, 
1475 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[R]ules governing partners’ interests in partnership assets also apply to 
joint ventures.”); 48A C.J.S. Joint Ventures § 24 (2004) (“As in a partnership, in respect of their 
mutual rights and liabilities, each member of a joint venture has the dual status of principal for 
himself or herself and agent for his or her associates within the scope of the enterprise.”). 
 14. See Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, Attachment A at 16–17 
(“[E]mployees, agents, and co-conspirators of JGC willfully . . . caused the commission of FCPA 
violations by KBR, a domestic concern within the meaning of the FCPA, by aiding and abetting 
KBR in causing wire transfers of $39.8 million from [the joint venture’s] bank account in 
Amsterdam, The Netherlands, via a correspondent bank account in New York, New York, to a 
[Swiss] bank account . . . , intending that the money would be used, in whole or in part, to pay 
bribes to Nigerian government officials.”). Although the deferred-prosecution agreement 
focuses on wire transfers through New York as a possible alternative basis for jurisdiction, the 
agreement’s cover does not cite the FCPA’s territorial provision. See id. at 1 (listing only 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006)). 
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structure.15 The FCPA’s antibribery provisions16 apply to three classes 
of persons: 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 applies to issuers of securities on U.S. 
exchanges;17 § 78dd-2 applies to domestic concerns;18 and § 78dd-3 
applies to all other persons or entities when acting within the United 
States.19 Each section also provides for vicarious liability for 
companies whose agents or employees violate the provision.20 
Because JGC was neither an issuer21 nor a domestic concern,22 it was 
subject only to § 78dd-3—which provides for jurisdiction over acts 
that occur within the United States, that is, territorial jurisdiction23—
as well as the FCPA’s vicarious-liability provisions.24 
Prosecutions under the FCPA of companies like JGC—
companies that are incorporated and headquartered in foreign 
countries and that do not issue stock on American exchanges—pose 
challenging questions regarding the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law. Although the prosecutors, as members of the executive 
branch, theoretically consider foreign-policy implications of their 
 
 15. For more information on the structure of the FCPA, see infra Part I.A. 
 16. The FCPA also contains recordkeeping requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b) (2006). 
 17. Id. § 78dd-1 (2006). This section applies to companies that are considered “issuers” 
under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp 
(2006 & Supp. IV 2011), which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78l, and to companies that are required 
to file reports under section 15(d) of the 1934 Act, which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78o(d). The 
1934 Act defines an “issuer” as “any person who issues or proposes to issue any security.” Id. 
§ 78c(a)(8). A “person” is “a natural person, company, government, or political subdivision, 
agency, or instrumentality of a government.” Id. § 78c(a)(9). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. Domestic concerns include U.S. citizens and residents, as well as 
companies incorporated under U.S. law. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1). 
 19. Id. § 78dd-3. For a detailed discussion of what it means to act within the United States, 
see infra Part II.A. 
 20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a); see also supra note 13. 
 21. See Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. Securities & Exchange 
Commission, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/
internatl/foreigngeographic2010.pdf (listing foreign companies registered as issuers in 2010); 
Foreign Companies Registered and Reporting with the U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission, 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 31, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/
foreignalpha2004.pdf (listing foreign issuers in 2004, the last year of the alleged criminal bribery 
in the Bonny Island Project case). 
 22. Deferred Prosecution Agreement, supra note 1, Attachment A at 2. 
 23. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (stating that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person other than 
an issuer . . . or a domestic concern . . . while in the territory of the United States, . . . to do 
any . . . act in furtherance of” the crime of bribing a foreign official (emphasis added)). 
 24. See id. (stating that “[i]t shall be unlawful for . . . any officer, director, employee, or 
agent of such person or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such person, while in the 
territory of the United States, . . . to do any . . . act in furtherance of” the crime of bribing a 
foreign official). 
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enforcement decisions, broad application of the FCPA to foreign 
companies in practice has the potential to contravene international 
jurisdictional norms and seriously implicate American foreign 
policy.25 The pressure upon international defendants such as JCG to 
settle is so high that companies may acquiesce to a non- or deferred-
prosecution agreement, even if their actions may fall beyond the 
scope of the law or the jurisdiction of the DOJ or the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to enforce the law.26 Furthermore, 
these questions are especially pressing in a context of increasingly 
aggressive enforcement patterns.27 Clearly defined limits to the 
agencies’ jurisdiction would solve this potentially politically sensitive 
problem. 
This Note’s two goals are to describe the current state of the law 
and to delineate the outer boundaries of justifiable jurisdiction28 over 
foreign companies whose actions occur extraterritorially. It concludes 
with a proposed interpretation of what this Note calls the territorial 
provision, § 78dd-3, which would restrict the FCPA’s application to 
actions that have only a tangential territorial connection to the 
United States, by using the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
Unlike the text of the rest of the antibribery provisions of the FCPA, 
§ 78dd-3 specifically includes an element of territoriality in its 
application to nonissuers and nondomestic concerns.29 This territorial 
provision, ambiguous in a simple textual or purposive analysis, finally 
gains an appropriate meaning when viewed in light of the 
longstanding presumption against extraterritoriality. This proposed 
 
 25. See H. Lowell Brown, The Extraterritorial Reach of the U.S. Government’s Campaign 
Against International Bribery, 22 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 407, 521 (1999) (“Congress 
recognized that this exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction risked offending the sovereignty of 
other nations and the concomitant harm to U.S. international relations.”). For more information 
on the foreign-policy effects of extraterritorial application of American law, see generally David 
H. Small, Managing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Problems: The United States Government 
Approach, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 283, 285–87 (1987). 
 26. These two agencies have joint responsibility for enforcement of the FCPA. DEMING, 
supra note 13, at 4. 
 27. See infra notes 99–108 and accompanying text. 
 28. In this Note, the term “jurisdiction” refers to the scope of the conduct that the FCPA 
actually proscribes, rather than a court’s authority to hear a case brought under the statute. For 
a more detailed explanation of jurisdiction and the FCPA, see infra Part I.B. For a more 
detailed discussion of the concepts of territoriality and jurisdiction, see infra Part III.A. 
 29. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (stating that the proscribed conduct must occur within the 
territory of the United States), with id. § 78dd-1 (lacking such a territorial requirement). For 
more explanation, see supra notes 17–24. 
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reading removes significant foreign-policy concerns and provides 
clarity to a law that is ambiguous as currently applied. 
Part I provides the necessary background for this Note’s analysis. 
It begins with a detailed description of the FCPA’s provisions. The 
remainder of Part I discusses the FCPA’s origins in the wake of the 
Watergate scandal, the legislative history surrounding its 1977 
enactment and subsequent revisions, and current enforcement 
patterns. Part II lays out the basic interpretive methods relevant to 
imposing limits on the application of the FCPA’s antibribery 
provisions.30 It applies traditional statutory-interpretation techniques 
to the question of the FCPA’s extraterritoriality, examining the plain 
meaning of the statute’s text and also analyzing the statute’s 
legislative history, including the history of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD’s) Convention 
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions (OECD Convention).31 Both interpretive 
methods establish as ambiguous the degree of territoriality required 
to trigger § 78dd-3, necessitating Part III’s turn to foreign relations 
law, the study of the interrelation between U.S. and international 
law.32 This Part examines the FCPA’s relationship to international law 
and places the FCPA within the broader American jurisprudence 
regarding extraterritoriality. It identifies several interpretive canons 
from foreign relations law and explains why the presumption against 
extraterritoriality should apply to the FCPA’s jurisdictional questions. 
Although foreign relations law seems inherently relevant to an 
analysis of the FCPA’s jurisdiction over foreign entities, it has been 
 
 30. This analysis focuses on the antibribery provisions of § 78dd-1 to § 78dd-3, rather than 
the more nebulous recordkeeping provisions contained in § 78m(b). The antibribery provisions 
mirror more closely the standard actus reus requirement of a criminal offense, whereas the 
accounting provisions impose an affirmative duty on companies that register to issue and 
conduct transactions with securities on American exchanges under section 12 of the 1934 Act, 
15 U.S.C. § 78l (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 31. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, done 
Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998). 
 32. See CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES 
& MATERIALS, at xix (2d ed. 2006) (“This casebook examines the constitutional and statutory 
law that regulates the conduct of U.S. foreign relations. The topics covered include the 
distribution of foreign relations authority between the three federal branches, the relationship 
between the federal government and the states in regulating foreign relations, and the status of 
international law in U.S. courts.”). 
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largely missing from current scholarship.33 Therefore, this Note adds a 
new, largely theoretical approach to answering questions about the 
legal limits of the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach. 
I.  THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: CONTENT, HISTORY, 
AND PRESENT ENFORCEMENT ENVIRONMENT 
This Part provides background information, providing context 
for subsequent layers of interpretive techniques. Part I.A treats the 
history and content of the FCPA in depth, focusing on the antibribery 
provisions. It sets out the elements of the crime and discusses the 
origins of the FCPA in the fallout from the Watergate scandal of the 
early 1970s. It then traces the legislative history of the original 1977 
enactment through the 1988 and 1998 amendments. Part I.B begins by 
describing why the FCPA poses significant jurisdictional questions. 
Part I.B also explains various theories under which regulators may 
pursue foreign entities for foreign conduct that violates the FCPA. 
A. Background: Text and Purpose 
1. Origins of the FCPA.  Instances of overseas commercial 
bribery surfaced in the wake of the Watergate scandal, spurring 
Congress to enact the world’s first anticorruption statute,34 the FCPA, 
 
 33. See, e.g., Henry Klehm III, Joan E. McKown & Emily A. Posner, Securities 
Enforcement Has Crossed the Border: Regulatory Authorities Respond to the Financial Crisis 
with a Call for Greater International Cooperation, but Where Will That Lead?, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 927 (2011) (leaving extraterritoriality out of a discussion of regulators’ “increased efforts to 
combat corruption and bribery at a global level”); Roger M. Witten, Kimberly A. Parker, Jay 
Holtmeier & Thomas J. Koffer, Prescriptions for Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery Controls in Pharmaceutical and 
Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691 (2009) (lacking significant discussion of jurisdiction 
despite giving “practical advice on the compliance programs”). But see Matt A. Vega, The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Culture of Bribery: Expanding the Scope of Private Whistleblower 
Suits to Overseas Employees, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 425, 487–500 (2009) (including a thorough 
analysis of jurisdictional issues when arguing that section 806 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006), should be interpreted to protect FCPA whistleblowers). 
Scholarship on the FCPA has been heavily practitioner-focused, with the vast majority of the 
seven hundred secondary sources on the subject written for practicing lawyers rather than for 
scholars. Most of the relevant materials were found in the form of continuing legal education 
materials, newsletters, and texts and treatises as opposed to law-review articles (data found 
through Westlaw searches conducted on January 4, 2012). 
 34. Tor Krever, Curbing Corruption? The Efficacy of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 33 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 83, 87 (2007); Arthur F. Matthews, Internal Corporate 
Investigations, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 655, 662 (1984). 
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in 1977.35 The new law prohibited businesses and their agents and 
employees from making payments or gifts to foreign officials.36 Earlier 
in the decade, dozens of large American companies had voluntarily 
disclosed to the SEC that they had made bribes that helped them 
obtain business in a number of foreign countries.37 The 1976 report 
issued by the SEC, Report of the Securities Exchange Commission on 
Questionable and Illegal Corporate Payments and Practices,38 
disclosed past bribery and provided the impetus for the FCPA.39 The 
SEC report contained information about SEC investigations, revealed 
the widespread practice of commercial bribery of foreign public 
officials, and analyzed eighty-nine disclosures of questionable 
payments.40 More than three hundred American companies were 
implicated.41 
During this period before the FCPA was enacted, the SEC 
brought public enforcement actions for illicit payments to foreign 
officials against well-known companies, such as Gulf Oil, Phillips 
Petroleum, General Tire & Rubber, Lockheed, and United Brands.42 
Enforcement continued after the FCPA was enacted with actions 
against Boeing, International Telephone & Telegraph, Page Airways, 
Firestone Tire & Rubber, and International Systems & Controls.43 
The most famous scandal, dubbed “Bananagate,” involved a $1.25 
million payment by United Brands to the president of Honduras to 
 
 35. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 36. Id. §§ 103–104, 91 Stat. at 1494–98 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to -2 
(2006)). 
 37. Lucinda A. Low, Owen Bonheimer & Negar Katirai, Enforcement of the FCPA in the 
United States: Trends and the Effects of International Standards, in THE FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT 2008: COPING WITH HEIGHTENED ENFORCEMENT RISKS 711, 715 (PLI Corp. 
L. & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B-1665, 2008). 
 38. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 
(1976). 
 39. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1–2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4099; see also 
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, supra note 38, at 57 (“[T]he question of illegal or questionable 
payments is obviously a matter of international concern, and the Commission, therefore, is of 
the view that limited-purpose legislation in this area is desirable in order to demonstrate clear 
Congressional policy with respect to a thorny and controversial problem.”). 
 40. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1–2, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4099. 
 41. Id. at 3, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4101. 
 42. Matthews, supra note 34, at 664. 
 43. Id. at 664–65. 
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avoid an export duty on bananas.44 According to a contemporary 
commentator, the revelations of these payments “[shook] foreign 
governments, rocked American corporate management, and 
tarnished the image of American private enterprise both at home and 
abroad.”45 
It was thus in response to these illicit payments made by 
American companies that the original version of the FCPA was 
passed in 1977. The Senate report on the bill that became the FCPA46 
states that the bill “[m]akes it a crime for U.S. companies to bribe a 
foreign government official.”47 The original version of the FCPA only 
applied to issuers48 and domestic concerns.49 Since the original 
enactment, Congress amended the FCPA twice, each time in 
response to concerns that the prohibition on payments to foreign 
officials was a significant burden on American businesses vis-à-vis 
their foreign competitors.50 
2. Contents of the FCPA.  The FCPA, part of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),51 is divided into two parts: the 
antibribery provisions, which make it a crime to bribe foreign 
officials,52 and the accounting provisions, which impose upon 
companies various bookkeeping obligations.53 The former follow the 
traditional pattern of a crime, with a requisite actus reus and mens 
rea,54 whereas the latter impose affirmative obligations on 
companies.55 Companies that are defined as issuers under section 12 
 
 44. John C. Coffee, Jr., Beyond the Shut-Eyed Sentry: Toward a Theoretical View of 
Corporate Misconduct and an Effective Legal Response, 63 VA. L. REV. 1099, 1116 (1977). 
 45. Charles R. McManis, Questionable Corporate Payments Abroad: An Antitrust 
Approach, 86 YALE L.J. 215, 215 (1976) (footnotes omitted). 
 46. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1495 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o, 78dd-1 to -3 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 47. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4100. 
 48. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 § 103, 91 Stat. at 1495–96 (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78dd-1 (2006)). 
 49. Id. § 104, 91 Stat. at 1496–98 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006)). 
 50. See infra Part I.A.3. 
 51. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 52. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3. 
 53. Id. § 78m(b). 
 54. See, e.g., id. § 78dd-1(a) (describing what constitutes the prohibited act of bribing a 
foreign official); id. § 78dd-1(f)(2) (defining the mental culpability required to violate the 
FCPA). 
 55. See id. § 78m(b)(2) (requiring issuers to, inter alia, “make and keep books, records, and 
accounts” and “devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls”). 
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of the 1934 Act56 or that are required to file reports subject to section 
15(d) of the 1934 Act57 are subject to both sets of provisions.58 
Individuals may also be prosecuted for criminal acts of bribery.59 
The antibribery provisions are composed of three separate 
sections, each regulating different types of entities. The first section, 
§ 78dd-1, applies to issuers,60 which consist of foreign and domestic 
companies that are publicly listed on U.S. stock exchanges or that are 
required to register with the SEC pursuant to other provisions of the 
1934 Act.61 The second section, § 78dd-2, proscribes bribery 
committed by “domestic concerns,” who are nonissuers that are U.S. 
citizens, nationals, or residents as well as companies that are either 
incorporated in the United States or that have their principal place of 
business in the United States.62 Sections 78dd-1 and 78dd-2 both 
contain “alternative jurisdiction” provisions that specifically proscribe 
issuers’ and domestic concerns’ acts of bribery that occur outside of 
the United States.63 The final section, § 78dd-3, regulates the conduct 
of entities not covered by § 78dd-1 or § 78dd-2, including foreign 
citizens, residents, and corporations.64 Unlike the first two provisions, 
§ 78dd-3 specifically states that it has only territorial application.65 It 
requires that acts that further the crime occur “while in the territory of 
the United States.”66 
 
 56. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 78l. 
 57. Id. § 15(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78o. 
 58. E.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m(b)(2), 78o(d), 78dd-1 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 59. Each section applies to “any officer, director, employee, or agent” of the issuer, 
domestic concern, or other entity. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3. 
 60. See id. § 78j-1(f) (defining the term “issuer”). 
 61. Id. § 78dd-1. 
 62. Id. § 78dd-2. 
 63. Id. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i). This type of alternative jurisdiction rests on the 
“nationality” principle of jurisdiction, which allows states to “exercise prescriptive jurisdiction 
over their own nationals, even when they are located outside national territory.” JEFFREY L. 
DUNOFF, STEVEN R. RATNER & DAVID WIPPMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: NORMS, ACTORS, 
PROCESS 346 (3d ed. 2010); see also Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 433, 442–43 (1932) 
(holding a U.S. citizen living in France guilty of contempt of court in the United States based 
upon this principle). 
 64. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). 
 65. Id. This section does not have a similar alternative-jurisdiction provision for 
extraterritorial application. See id. § 78dd-3. 
 66. Id. § 78dd-3(a) (emphasis added). More fully, § 78dd-3 states that “[i]t shall be unlawful 
for any person . . . while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of the mails 
or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of” 
the crime. Id. 
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To violate the FCPA’s antibribery provisions, all elements of the 
crime—which are identical for each of the three sections—must be 
met. The actor must (1) commit an act in furtherance of (2) “an offer, 
payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment” (3) “of 
any money, or offer, gift” or “the giving of anything of value to” 
(4) “any foreign official” (5) for a listed corrupt purpose that aids the 
actor “in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing 
business to, any person.”67 The listed purposes include influencing a 
foreign-government actor’s official decisions, inducing a foreign 
official to do or to omit to do an act that violates the law, “securing 
any improper advantage,” or inducing a foreign official to use his or 
her influence to affect the decision of a foreign government or 
instrumentality.68 Furthermore, the law proscribes payments for 
similar purposes to foreign political parties, party officials, or 
candidates for office.69 The FCPA also makes it unlawful to pay a 
third party “while knowing that all or a portion of such money or 
thing of value” will be given to a foreign official to gain a business 
advantage.70 
All three provisions contain the additional qualification that the 
actor must “make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of 
interstate commerce corruptly.”71 This requirement, however, need 
not be met when invoking the alternative-jurisdiction provisions, 
which establish “nationality” jurisdiction for issuers’ or domestic 
concerns’ actions abroad regardless of the interstate-commerce 
nexus.72 In addition to making use of interstate commerce corruptly, 
nonissuer nondomestic concerns must also commit an act “in the 
territory of the United States.”73 The FCPA also contains several 
exceptions or affirmative defenses that allow an actor to escape 
liability for what would otherwise be an illegal act of bribery.74 
 
 67. Id. § 78dd-2(a). The elements of the crime are the same in the other sections. Id. 
§§ 78dd-1, -3. 
 68. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(1), -2(a)(1), -3(a)(1). 
 69. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(2), -2(a)(2), -3(a)(2). 
 70. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), -2(a)(3), -3(a)(3). 
 71. Id. §§ 78dd-1(a), -2(a), -3(a). 
 72. Id. §§ 78dd-1(g), -2(i); see also supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 73. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a). 
 74. The major exception covers “facilitating or expediting payment[s]” with the purpose of 
simply hastening or “secur[ing] the performance of a routine governmental action.” Id. §§ 
78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b). Some commentators argue, however, that prosecutors and 
practitioners have read this exception narrowly, so that it applies only in very limited 
circumstances. See, e.g., F. Joseph Warin, Charles Falconer & Michael S. Diamant, The British 
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3. The FCPA’s Subsequent History.  The FCPA was first 
amended by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 
1988,75 enacted as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness 
Act of 1988.76 The amendments attempted to address the public 
perception that the FCPA placed American businesses at a 
disadvantage in the world marketplace.77 Despite this concern, the 
amendments did not attempt to regulate the conduct of foreign 
persons through domestic criminal law.78 Ten years later, Congress 
amended the FCPA again, this time to prepare the United States for 
accession to the OECD Convention79 through the International Anti-
Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998.80 
The OECD Convention is a binding treaty implemented via the 
respective domestic anticorruption laws81 of its thirty-nine signatory 
states.82 The United States provided the impetus for the OECD 
 
Are Coming!: Britain Changes Its Law on Foreign Bribery and Joins the International Fight 
Against Corruption, 46 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 42 (2010) (“The area of facilitating payments is a 
particularly thorny one for FCPA compliance. . . . [M]any practitioners increasingly fear that 
U.S. regulators have simply read the exception out of the statute.”). Additionally, an affirmative 
defense covers payments and gifts that are “lawful under the written laws . . . of the foreign 
official’s . . . country.” 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), -2(c)(1), -3(c)(1). Another affirmative defense 
applies to a payment or gift that was “a reasonable and bona fide expenditure, such as travel 
and lodging expenses, incurred by or on behalf of a foreign official . . . and was directly related 
to” promoting or showing products or services or the performance of a contract with the foreign 
government. Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), -2(c)(2); -3(c)(2). 
 75. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, tit. V, subtit. 
A, pt. I, §§ 5001–5003, 102 Stat. 1415 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1 to -2, 
78ff (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 76. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 77. Beverley H. Earle, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments: The Omnibus Trade 
and Competitiveness Act’s Focus on Improving Investment Opportunities, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
549, 551–52 (1989). At that time, the FCPA was still the world’s only foreign anticorruption law, 
more than a decade after its enactment. Id. at 552. 
 78. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of 1988 §§ 5001–03, 102 Stat. at 1415–
25. 
 79. Low et al., supra note 37, at 715; see also 144 CONG. REC. 27,653 (1998) (statement of 
Sen. Conrad Burns) (“The amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) [were] 
approved by the Senate today, to implement in the United States the OECD Convention . . . .”); 
144 CONG. REC. 27,350 (1998) (statement of Rep. Thomas Bliley, Jr.) (“This legislation is 
designed to help level the playing field for American companies doing business overseas.”). 
 80. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 
Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)). 
 81. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, supra note 31, arts. 1–10, 37 I.L.M. at 4–6. 
 82. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International 
Business Transactions: Ratification Status as of April 2012, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/
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Convention, encouraging other developed nations to adopt similar 
antibribery laws so that American businesses regulated by the FCPA 
would not be significantly disadvantaged in the world marketplace.83 
Although important parts of the OECD Convention are patterned 
after the FCPA,84 the United States still had to modify its existing 
domestic law to ensure compliance with certain treaty sections, 
including Article 4, which is the OECD Convention’s provision on 
jurisdiction.85 This article states that a signatory shall “take such 
measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the 
bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is committed in 
whole or in part in its territory” and prosecute its own nationals for 
acts conducted abroad to bribe foreign officials if the country allows 
such extraterritorial jurisdiction.86 
The 1998 amendments to the FCPA, which implemented the 
OECD Convention, introduced the alternative jurisdiction sections to 
§ 78dd-1 and § 78dd-2, which explicitly call for extraterritorial 
application.87 Section 78dd-3 broadened the FCPA’s reach beyond 
issuers and domestic concerns for the first time.88 Congress expanded 
the FCPA’s application primarily, if not solely, in response to the 
 
briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/40272933.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2012). 
Recent scholarship suggests that only four nations have actively enforced its provisions, while 
another twenty ratifying nations have conducted little or no enforcement. Developments in the 
Law—Extraterritoriality, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1226, 1285 (2011). 
 83. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 10 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-105hrpt802/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt802.pdf (“Beginning in 1989, the U.S. government began 
an effort to convince our trading partners at the OECD to criminalize the bribery of foreign 
public officials. Achieving comparable prohibitions in other developed countries and combating 
corruption generally has been a major priority of the U.S. business community, the U.S. 
Congress, and successive Administrations since the late 1970s.”); see also id. (“[The 1998] 
legislation, coupled with implementation of the OECD Convention by our major trading 
partners, is designed to result in a substantial leveling of the playing field for U.S. businesses.”). 
 84. See Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey & Jutta Birmele, The 1998 OECD 
Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Changes in Attitudes Toward Corruption in Business 
Transactions, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 486 (2000) (“An important component of the Convention is 
its emulation of the corporate accountability approach of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) to detect corrupt payments.” (citations omitted)). 
 85. See infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 86. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, supra note 31, art. 4, 37 I.L.M. at 5. If an act occurs for which multiple signatory 
nations could have jurisdiction, the parties are to consult to determine the best country to 
prosecute the corruption. Id. 
 87. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 
§§ 2–3, 112 Stat. 3302, 3302–05 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), -2(d) (2006)). 
 88. Id. § 4, 112 Stat. at 3306–09 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3 (2006)). 
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OECD Convention requirements.89 In fact, when enacting these 
jurisdictional expansions, Congress paid special attention to do so 
only “when consistent with national legal and constitutional 
principles.”90 
B. Extraterritoriality and the FCPA 
The FCPA presents particular problems that arise from 
extraterritoriality because it regulates conduct abroad, lacks certain 
delineation of its scope, and is actively enforced. This Section first 
explains why these three qualities make the FCPA particularly 
problematic in the extraterritorial context and then turns to the 
various jurisdictional theories that would bring foreign companies and 
individuals under the law’s scope. 
1. Problems Arising from Extraterritorial Application of the 
FCPA.  First, FCPA prosecutions have the potential to spark foreign-
relations tensions. Any prosecution of a foreign corporation can have 
significant policy implications, including “host country resentment” 
and “transnational tension and strife.”91 FCPA prosecutions have the 
potential to be especially controversial because the FCPA regulates 
conduct with an international effect, so the connection that creates an 
American interest in foreign corporations’ activities abroad is often 
particularly tenuous.92 To compound the issue, enforcement against 
 
 89. See S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 2–3 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-105srpt277/pdf/CRPT-105srpt277.pdf (“[T]he OECD Convention calls on parties to 
cover ‘any person’; the current FCPA covers only issuers with securities registered under the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act and ‘domestic concerns.’ The Act, therefore, expands the FCPA’s 
coverage to include all foreign persons who commit an act in furtherance of a foreign bribe 
while in the United States.” (quoting Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 31, art. 1(1), 37 I.L.M. at 4; and 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (1994))). 
 90. See id. at 3 (“This exercise of jurisdiction over U.S. businesses and nationals for 
unlawful conduct abroad is consistent with U.S. legal and constitutional principles . . . . It is 
within the constitutional grant of power to Congress to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations’ and to ‘define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations.’” (last alteration in 
original) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 3, 10)). 
 91. Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global Harmony, 20 
MICH. J. INT’L L. 419, 433 (1999). 
 92. See H. Lowell Brown, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Under the 1998 Amendments to the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Does the Government’s Reach Now Exceed Its Grasp?, 26 N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG. 239, 240 (2001) (“[E]nlargement of the extraterritorial effect of the 
[FCPA’s] antibribery provisions may prove to be the most significant and challenging foray by 
the United States into the regulation of international business . . . .”); id. at 358–59 (“[T]he 
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foreign entities has become a new norm; eight of the ten largest 
FCPA settlements in American history involve foreign companies.93 
Second, deferred-prosecution agreements have become the norm 
in FCPA actions, which has led to a dearth of judicial guidance on the 
FCPA’s jurisdictional scope.94 Companies shy away from litigating 
FCPA violations because of uncertainty, expense, and the potential 
for reputational harm.95 Because most companies settle with the DOJ 
or SEC, the judiciary rarely produces opinions on the FCPA.96 As a 
result, “a multitude of legal issues associated with the FCPA have yet 
to be subject to judicial review,” and courts may interpret key 
provisions differently from the way that the DOJ and SEC have 
previously presented them.97 In light of this phenomenon, one district 
 
jurisdictional reach of the amended FCPA with regard to foreign nationals extends to virtually 
any contact with the United States, however glancing.”). 
 93. Richard L. Cassin, J&J Joins New Top Ten, FCPA BLOG (Apr. 8, 2011, 4:43 PM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2011/4/8/jj-joins-new-top-ten.html. 
 94. See DEMING, supra note 13, at 4 (“[The FCPA’s] provisions have rarely been subject to 
judicial scrutiny.”); Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non- 
Prosecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 7 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 137, 156 (2010) (“[T]he number of precedents developed under the FCPA 
remains quite low despite great legal uncertainty surrounding the law, in large part due to the 
use of DPAs [deferred-prosecution agreements] and NPAs [nonprosecution agreements].”); see 
also Benjamin M. Greenblum, Note, What Happens to a Prosecution Deferred?: Judicial 
Oversight of Corporate Deferred Prosecution Agreements, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1863, 1869–70 
(2005) (discussing the limited judicial role in deferred-prosecution agreements). 
 95. See, e.g., Cortney C. Thomas, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Decade of 
Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439, 441–42 & n.9 (2010) 
(explaining the cost of lawsuits to companies and the possibility of lost revenues from damaged 
reputations). In addition to these costs, companies found liable under the FCPA may also be 
liable under other criminal statutes, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)) that use an FCPA 
violation as a predicate offense, Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices 
Law, 32 MICH. J. INT’L L. 129, 134 (2010); see also, e.g., Dooley v. United Techs. Corp., 803 F. 
Supp. 428, 438 (D.D.C. 1992) (“The Travel Act[, 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988 & Supp. III 1992), 
is] . . . one of the enumerated predicate acts of racketeering under RICO . . . . Dooley charges 
that the British and Saudi defendants committed Travel Act violations because their actions 
violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. . . . Thus, the success of plaintiff Dooley’s RICO-
related claim that the . . . defendants committed Travel Act violations, hinges on whether these 
defendants violated the FCPA.”). Some have argued that this application conflates the meaning 
of both statutes. See, e.g., Raymond J. Dowd, Note, Civil RICO Misread: The Judicial Repeal of 
the 1988 Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 14 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 946, 947 
(1990) (“This Note argues that civil RICO should not provide a remedy for a party claiming 
injury due to the commercial bribery of a foreign official.”). 
 96. See Brooks, supra note 94, at 138 (“[T]he long-term consequences of [deferred or 
nonprosecution] agreements perpetuate ambiguities surrounding enforcement of the FCPA.”). 
 97. DEMING, supra note 13, at 4. In fact, this different interpretation has occurred in at 
least one case; the judge acquitted the defendant due to a lack of jurisdiction. Daniel Matzkin, 
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court judge described the current state of FCPA enforcement as “a 
stew of confusion and hypocrisy.”98 
Finally, the international and domestic focus on anticorruption 
has grown dramatically in the past fifteen years. Both developed 
countries and emerging economic powers have adopted antibribery 
legislation prohibiting payments to foreign officials for the purpose of 
obtaining business.99 International financial institutions’ devotion of 
resources to anti-money-laundering enforcement efforts in the wake 
of 9/11,100 coupled with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,101 have led to 
a greater focus on corporate compliance, ethics programs, and 
accurate recordkeeping.102 The DOJ and SEC also began to enforce 
the FCPA more proactively,103 leading to increases in prosecutions, 
penalties, and voluntary disclosures.104 From 2004 to 2009, the number 
of FCPA enforcement actions brought by the DOJ and SEC 
increased eightfold, rising from five to forty.105 By 2011, fines of more 
than $20 million were not uncommon as criminal penalties,106 and 
payments in the eight largest settlements have ranged from $137 
million to $800 million.107 Although self-reporting has risen 
 
District Judge Issues Unprecedented Limitation on FCPA’s Jurisdictional Reach, 
ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (June 15, 2011), http://www.anticorruptionblog.com/foreign-corrupt-
practices-act/district-judge-issues-unprecedented-limitation-on-fcpas-jurisdictional-reach (“The 
Court rejected the government’s argument for FCPA jurisdiction over Patel . . . founded on 
Patel’s mailing a DHL package containing a purchase agreement in furtherance of a corrupt 
scheme from the United Kingdom to the United States.”). 
 98. SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 309 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 99. DEMING, supra note 13, at xvii. For example, the United Kingdom’s Bribery Act, 2010, 
c. 23, §§ 1–20, passed in April 2010 and effective in July 2011, created a wave of publicity in the 
business community, see, e.g., Warin et al., supra note 74, at 7 (discussing how the United 
Kingdom’s Serious Fraud Office “was gearing up for action” by “increas[ing] the number of 
officials assigned to overseas corruption matters” and “adopt[ing] new strategies to combat 
international corruption”). 
 100. Low et al., supra note 37, at 715. 
 101. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 102. Low et al., supra note 37, at 716. 
 103. Thomas, supra note 95, at 439–40. 
 104. Low et al., supra note 37, at 742–43. 
 105. F. Joseph Warin, John W.F. Chesley & Patrick F. Speice, Jr., Nine Lessons of 2009: The 
Year-in-Review of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 38 SEC. REG. L.J. 19, 21 (2010). 
 106. See Thomas McSorley, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 48 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 749, 779 
(2011) (describing fines of $24.8 million for Lockheed Corp. and $26 million for Vetco 
International Ltd. in 2007). 
 107. Cassin, supra note 93. Increased enforcement has created resistance, ranging from a 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce legal team striving “to make the case that the law is out of date” to 
members of Congress publicly announcing a desire to overhaul the FCPA. Carrie Johnson, 
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dramatically due to perceived favorable treatment for voluntary 
disclosures of violations, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
has also taken a more active investigatory role.108 This atmosphere of 
heightened enforcement, coupled with uncertainty about the law’s 
scope and its potential foreign relations implications, make the 
jurisdictional questions surrounding its application particularly vexing 
and relevant. 
2. Foreign Parties Within the FCPA’s Scope.  Given the three 
problems raised by the FCPA’s application to foreign parties, it is 
necessary to consider the four ways in which the conduct of foreign 
parties109 may become governed by the FCPA. The first is when 
foreign companies choose to list stock on American exchanges and 
become issuers.110 This jurisdictional hook is uncontroversial, because 
issuers are subject to the bulk of the federal securities laws.111 The 
second is when a company commits an act in furtherance of a crime in 
United States territory.112 This hook is again uncontroversial, because 
jurisdiction in criminal law generally rests upon a theory of 
territoriality: if an individual commits a criminal act in a certain 
territory, that territory’s sovereign has jurisdiction.113 The last two 
 
Businesses Push Back on Foreign Bribery Law, NPR (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/
10/19/141473145/businesses-push-back-on-foreign-bribery-law. 
 108. McSorley, supra note 106, at 779. There were reportedly at least six ongoing FBI FCPA 
investigations in 2011, id. at 779–80, including an undercover FBI sting operation that led to a 
highly publicized arrest of twenty-two individuals for FCPA violations, Press Release, Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of Military and Law 
Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010), available 
at http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2010/wfo011910.htm. 
 109. This Section uses foreign companies as an example, although it is important to note 
that FCPA prosecutions of individuals, including foreign individuals, have also been on the rise. 
See, e.g., Roger M. Witten, Kimberly A. Parker, Jay Holtmeier & Lillian H. Potter, The 
Increased Prosecution of Individuals Under the FCPA: Trends and Implications, BLOOMBERG L. 
REP. RISK & COMPLIANCE, Dec. 2009, at 1, 1–3 (discussing the prosecutions of several 
individuals, including two foreign executives of companies subject to the FCPA, under similar 
theories as those described in the Introduction, supra). 
 110. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006). 
 111. 79A C.J.S. Securities Regulation § 130 (2011). 
 112. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. 
 113. See, e.g., State v. Butler, 724 A.2d 657, 660 (Md. 1999) (“Territorial jurisdiction 
describes the concept that only when an offense is committed within the boundaries of the 
court’s jurisdictional geographic territory . . . may the case be tried in that state.”); People v. 
McLaughlin, 606 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (N.Y. 1992) (“Because the State only has power to enact 
and enforce criminal laws within its territorial borders, there can be no criminal offense unless it 
has territorial jurisdiction.”). This concept of territorial jurisdiction is different from venue, 
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methods, those used in JGC’s deferred-prosecution agreement, are 
more controversial.114 One applies expansive vicarious-liability 
theories using agency relationships.115 The other interprets the 
territorial provisions of § 78dd-3 as covering acts in furtherance of the 
bribery that are minor or merely pass through the United States.116 
Although both vicarious liability under § 78dd-1 and § 78dd-2 and an 
extremely broad application of § 78dd-3 are accepted in theory, 
difficulties may arise in practice when foreign companies question 
American enforcement agencies’ jurisdiction over their conduct.117 
This final jurisdictional theory, using minor or pass-through acts 
as the basis for U.S. jurisdiction, can be the most problematic, as the 
wire transfer in the JGC case illustrates. In several cases, the DOJ has 
put forth the theory that wire transfers through American 
correspondent bank accounts—that is, accounts at other banks 
maintained to service customers through an interbank relationship—
are sufficient for a territorial act in furtherance of a crime, even if the 
money is not knowingly or intentionally routed to the United States 
and does not remain in the United States for a significant length of 
time.118 Possibly because of the shaky legal foundations on which this 
 
which is the location within the territory at which the trial should be held. Butler, 724 A.2d at 
665. 
 114. See Brown, supra note 92, at 359 (“By failing to link a violation of U.S. law to a 
demonstrable prejudice of national interest, the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA exceeds the 
legitimate grasp of U.S. legislative and enforcement authorities.”); PHILIP UROFSKY ET AL., 
SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, IT DOESN’T TAKE MUCH: EXPANSIVE JURISDICTION IN FCPA 
MATTERS 1 (2009), available at http://www.shearman.com/lt-030409-expansive-jurisdiction-in-
fcpa-matters (noting that such an “expansive jurisdictional claim” “poses both risks and 
opportunities for foreign companies as they do business in the global economy”). 
 115. DEMING, supra note 13, at 59. Vicarious liability for actions taken by an agent subject 
to the FCPA is predicated upon knowledge of or a high probability of a violation. Id. at 60–64. 
Its imposition stems from both the language of the FCPA and from general accomplice-liability 
principles of criminal law. Id. at 59. Vicarious liability also gives the accounting provisions of the 
FCPA a very broad scope. Warin et al., supra note 74, at 33. 
 116. See Warin et al., supra note 74, at 10 (“U.S. regulators have construed relatively minor 
acts, such as routing a payment through a U.S. bank account or e-mail traffic to the parent 
company in the U.S., as ‘act[s] in furtherance’ sufficient to trigger FCPA jurisdiction.” 
(alteration in original)). 
 117. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
 118. See Bruce Bean, Beyond All Boundaries: The Extraterritorial Grasp of Anti-Bribery 
Legislation, FCPA PROFESSOR BLOG (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/beyond-all-
boundaries-the-extraterritorial-grasp-of-anti-bribery-legislation (“In practice , . . the commerce 
clause nexus of the FCPA is met when a dollar wire transfer between two offshore jurisdictions 
clears through a New York money center bank, even though there was no ‘intent’ by either of 
the parties involved to have any connection with the U.S.”). This theory was also used in the 
prosecution of three of Siemens’ wholly foreign subsidiaries. See Complaint at 1, 3, SEC v. 
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jurisdictional theory rests, prosecutors have never relied exclusively 
upon it.119 Because of its contentiousness, however, the theory has 
received particular emphasis in practitioner pieces,120 one of which 
described the FCPA’s jurisdiction under § 78dd-3 as “near 
limitless.”121 Therefore, the next two Parts of this Note seek to 
propose a limit, using traditional methods of statutory interpretation, 
such as plain meaning and legislative history, and interpretive canons 
of foreign relations law. 
II.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: TEXT AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
This Part analyzes the FCPA using traditional statutory-
interpretation techniques. It seeks to discover the proper application 
of the statute to foreign nonissuers and pays special attention to the 
issue of merely tangential territorial connections, such as wire 
transfers of bribery funds or the simple act of mailing a package that 
will pass through the United States. Therefore, each Section examines 
whether the given mechanism of statutory construction clearly 
indicates where a dividing line should be placed between conduct that 
falls within the FCPA and conduct that does not. Part II.A examines 
the plain meaning of the territorial provision of § 78dd-3, and Part 
II.B scrutinizes the legislative history of the FCPA and its 
amendments. Both lines of analysis ultimately fail to provide a clear 
answer regarding the extent of the U.S. jurisdiction under the FCPA, 
necessitating the use of substantive canons from foreign relations law 
in Part III to resolve the ambiguity.122 
 
Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-cv-02167-RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.siemens.com/press/pool/de/events/2008-12-PK/SEC.pdf (alleging a violation of the 
FCPA stemming from “elaborate payment schemes to conceal the nature of . . . corrupt 
payments” that ultimately “made use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate 
commerce”). 
 119. See UROFSKY ET AL., supra note 114, at 3 (noting that the DOJ and SEC cited 
alternative jurisdictional grounds in both SEC v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft, No. 08-cv-02167-
RJL (D.D.C. Dec. 15, 2008), and the Bonny Island Project cases). 
 120. See, e.g., id. at 1 (noting that the “threat” of expansive jurisdiction “poses both risks 
and opportunities for foreign companies as they do business in the global economy”). 
 121. Mauro M Wolfe, Does the US Government Have Limitless Jurisdiction Enforcing the 
FCPA?, 3 NEWSL. CRIM. L. SEC. LEGAL PRAC. DIVISION INT’L B. ASS’N, May 2010, reprinted in 
MAURO M WOLFE, DOES THE US GOVERNMENT HAVE LIMITLESS JURISDICTION ENFORCING 
THE FCPA? 1 (2010), available at http://www.martindale.com/members/Article_Atachment
.aspx?od=299343&id=1055878&filename=asr-1055918.pdf. 
 122. Without statutory ambiguity, of course, there is no need to resort to jurisdiction-
limiting principles. Cf., e.g., Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 88–89 (2001) 
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A. The Plain Meaning of the FCPA’s Territorial Provision 
The FCPA specifically provides that foreign companies, unlike 
issuers or domestic concerns, must commit an act in furtherance of 
the bribe within the United States for their conduct to fall within the 
statute. Because the text of the statute itself is the root of statutory 
construction,123 this Section looks at whether a plain meaning to 
§ 78dd-3 can be gleaned from the text alone. The Supreme Court uses 
many canons of construction but begins with the plain meaning of the 
text:124 and “[w]hen the words of a statute are unambiguous . . . this 
first canon is also the last.”125 
Section 78dd-3, the only prong of the FCPA’s antibribery 
provisions that applies directly to foreign nonissuers, reads: “It shall 
be unlawful . . . while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to 
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or to do any other act in furtherance of” bribing a foreign 
official.126 The text contains the phrase “in the territory of the United 
States” as a necessary condition of the crime. This inclusion is 
particularly significant because § 78dd-3’s sister provisions, § 78dd-1 
and § 78dd-2, do not contain a similar clause. In fact, the parallel 
provisions relating to issuers and domestic concerns explicitly provide 
for extraterritorial application in an “alternative jurisdiction” section 
that § 78dd-3 lacks.127 These differences in language suggest a more 
limited extraterritorial application of § 78dd-3, but they do not 
express the degree of that limitation. 
The actual inquiry regarding the scope of § 78dd-3 is not as 
simple as the phrase “while in the territory of the United States” 
might suggest. Within the confines of the statute, it is not clear what it 
means to be “in the territory of the United States” while one is 
committing an act in furtherance of the crime or using an 
 
(refusing to apply the plaintiff’s preferred canon of construction when the statute in question 
was deemed unambiguous). 
 123. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 337 (1979). 
 124. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (noting that before 
turning to other available canons of construction, courts should first apply the “cardinal canon” 
that “courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a 
statute what it says”). 
 125. Id. at 254. 
 126. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(a) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 127. Compare § 78dd-1(g) (accommodating a theory of “alternative jurisdiction” that allows 
extraterritorial jurisdiction), and id. § 78dd-2(i) (same), with id. § 78dd-3 (lacking an alternative-
jurisdiction section that would provide for extraterritoriality). 
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instrumentality of interstate commerce. Conduct by a foreign entity 
that occurs primarily in a foreign country raises the particular 
difficulty of defining what constitutes such an “act” of bribery taking 
place while in the territory of the United States. Does the simple 
transfer of money, unintentionally through an American bank 
account, fall within those words? Does the act of mailing a package 
that will land on U.S. soil qualify? Looking within the confines of the 
FCPA alone, there is no definitive answer to these questions. 
The next line of inquiry is to deduce the meaning of the phrase 
“while in the territory of the United States” by looking at similar 
sections of the U.S. Code dealing with extraterritorial jurisdiction or 
jurisdiction over foreign parties.128 For example, anti-money-
laundering laws specify that jurisdiction exists over foreign parties 
who violate the law in a “financial transaction that occurs in whole or 
in part in the United States.”129 The statute criminalizing transnational 
acts of terrorism lays out jurisdiction, alternately, for specified acts 
committed “within the United States” and for extraterritorial acts 
intended to cause substantial harm within the United States.130 Other 
sections of the U.S. Code explicitly provide for jurisdiction over acts 
that violate that section but occur abroad by including the phrase, 
“[t]here is extraterritorial jurisdiction over [a violation of this 
provision],” which obviates any question as to the extent of 
jurisdiction.131 
 
 128. See Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia’s Textualism: The “New” New Legal Process, 12 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1597, 1598 (1991) (“Justice Scalia has urged an abandonment of the Court’s 
traditional use of legislative history to interpret statutes. In place of this historical or 
intentionalist approach Justice Scalia has argued that, generally speaking, the only legitimate 
source for interpretive guidance in statutory cases is the text of the statute at issue, or related 
provisions of enacted law which shed light on the meaning of the disputed text.” (emphasis 
added)). 
 129. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b)(2)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 130. See 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a)(1) (2006) (“Whoever, involving conduct transcending national 
boundaries and in a circumstance described [elsewhere in the section] (A) kills, kidnaps, maims, 
commits an assault resulting in serious bodily injury, or assaults with a dangerous weapon any 
person within the United States; or (B) creates a substantial risk of serious bodily injury to any 
other person by destroying or damaging any structure, conveyance, or other real or personal 
property within the United States or by attempting or conspiring to destroy or damage any 
structure, conveyance, or other real or personal property within the United States; in violation 
of the laws of any State, or the United States, shall be punished . . . .”). 
 131. E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 351(i) (2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1039(f) (2006); see also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339B(d) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (providing for extraterritorial jurisdiction over an offense 
under certain conditions). These provisions are typically a separate subsection of the statute. 
E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 351(i). The direct statements regarding extraterritorial application of American 
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This survey of territoriality and extraterritoriality in U.S. Code 
sections that define criminal offenses adds little insight to the 
meaning of § 78dd-3. First, the phrase “while in the territory of the 
United States” is unique.132 Because this phrase occurs nowhere else 
in thousands of U.S. Code provisions, determining a precise line that 
separates “while” one is or is not in the United States for FCPA 
purposes is difficult. Second, other U.S. Code provisions that indicate 
that an element of a crime must occur within the United States are 
often much clearer on exactly what conduct must occur within the 
United States.133 This key difference makes it difficult to extrapolate 
an interpretation from another provision of the U.S. Code to the 
FCPA. The fact that Congress has used significantly clearer 
provisions when defining territoriality and when providing for 
extraterritoriality helps to highlight the ambiguity of the territoriality 
provision of the FCPA. Although a strict textualist would end the 
inquiry with the text,134 others would turn to legislative history to 
interpret congressional intent to add meaning to the text. This Note 
next turns to the legislative history of the FCPA and its amendments 
to determine what must occur within the United States for conduct to 
fall within the ambit of § 78dd-3. 
B. Legislative Intent Behind the Enactment of the Territorial 
Provision 
This Section examines legislative history to determine 
congressional intent as to the scope of the FCPA’s application to 
foreign parties. When enacting the statute in 1977, Congress was 
faced with more than three hundred known instances of American 
 
law stem from the Supreme Court’s clear-statement rules about extraterritoriality. See infra 
note 173 and accompanying text. 
 132. This figure came from an exact-phrase search of the “USCA” database within Westlaw. 
 133. See supra notes 129–131 and accompanying text. For example, the money-laundering 
statute states that the territorial aspect involves a financial transaction, 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (2006 & 
Supp. IV 2011), as amended by Border Tunnel Prevention Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-127, 126 
Stat. 371, and the terrorism statute lays out four crimes that may trigger the statute, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2332b(a). 
 134. See, e.g., Jennifer M. Bandy, Note, Interpretive Freedom: A Necessary Component of 
Article III Judging, 61 DUKE L.J. 651, 655 (2011) (“[Justice Scalia] is particularly averse to the 
use of legislative history, not only because he believes it is an unreliable measure of 
congressional intent, but also because he fundamentally rejects the entire project of seeking 
legislative intent. To Justice Scalia, only the words of a statute have gone through the legislative 
process, and thus only the words are law.” (citations omitted)). 
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companies bribing foreign officials135 and with American companies 
creating “slush funds” for illicit payments overseas.136 The original 
House and Senate reports do not reference any instances of foreign 
bribery by foreign corporations.137 Additionally, around the same time 
that Congress deliberately created a narrow jurisdictional basis when 
enacting the FCPA, it amended138 the Export Administration Act of 
1969139 to “intentionally grant[] broad extraterritorial authority.”140 
This is only a partial picture, however, because the relevant 
provisions creating extraterritorial jurisdiction for issuers and 
domestic concerns, as well as the entirety of § 78dd-3, were not added 
to the FCPA until 1998.141 It is thus the legislative history of the 
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act, the statute that 
amended the FCPA to add those provisions, that is most relevant. 
The legislative history of the 1998 amendments does give some 
indication that Congress interpreted the phrase “while in the territory 
of the United States” rather literally. The House report that 
accompanied the legislation stated that the act in furtherance of the 
crime must be “taken within the territory of the United States.”142 The 
use of “taken within” instead of “while” strongly implies a deliberate 
action by the perpetrators in the United States rather than a simple 
electronic transfer that passes through the United States. Elsewhere, 
the report states: 
  Although this section limits jurisdiction over foreign nationals 
and companies to instances in which the foreign national or 
company takes some action while physically present within the 
territory of the United States, Congress does not thereby intend to 
 
 135. S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098, 4101. 
 136. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105srpt277/pdf/CRPT-105srpt277.pdf. 
 137. S. REP. NO. 95-114; H.R. REP. NO. 95-831 (1977) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121; H.R. REP. NO. 95-640 (1977). 
 138. Act of Dec. 28, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-223, tit. III, 91 Stat. 1629, replaced by Export 
Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
app. §§ 2401–2420 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)). 
 139. Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841, replaced by Export 
Administration Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-72, 93 Stat. 503 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. 
app. §§ 2401–2420). 
 140. Small, supra note 25, at 285. 
 141. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 
Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2006)). 
 142. H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 21 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
105hrpt802/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt802.pdf. 
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place a similar limit on the exercise of U.S. criminal jurisdiction over 
foreign nationals and companies under any other statute or 
regulation.143 
This quotation offers a compelling indication that, to Congress, 
the phrase “while in the territory of the United States” from § 78dd-3 
indicates a tangible physical presence, such as that of a person, rather 
than the fleeting electronic presence of an asset in a bank account. 
The House and Senate reports also contain somewhat contradictory 
statements about the degree of territoriality necessary to trigger 
§ 78dd-3,144 including the phrase, “an extensive physical connection to 
the bribery act is not required.”145 Therefore, although there are some 
indications that Congress intended the territorial provision of § 78dd-
3 to be taken literally, the presence of conflicting interpretations 
within the legislative history requires more than a cursory 
examination and compels consideration of the context of these 
seemingly conflicting sections. 
When passing the 1998 amendments to the FCPA, Congress was 
concerned with “achieving a level playing field” so that American 
companies prohibited from paying bribes were not at a disadvantage 
on the world marketplace.146 Congress’s method for realizing this 
purpose was to “[a]chiev[e] comparable prohibitions in other 
developed countries” by cooperating with international governments 
rather than unilaterally policing foreign nations’ illicit payments to 
other foreign nations’ officials.147 The OECD Convention was the end 
result.148 Congress considered the International Anti-Bribery and Fair 
Competition Act, including the added § 78dd-3 providing liability for 
territorial acts of foreign parties, to be implementing legislation for 
the OECD Convention.149 Thus, because all of the 1998 changes 
incorporate treaty provisions, the FCPA as currently written must be 
 
 143. Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
 144. The legislative history indicates both that territoriality “should be interpreted broadly” 
and that jurisdiction is “limit[ed] . . . to instances in which the foreign national or company takes 
some action while physically present within the territory of the United States.” S. REP. NO. 105-
277, at 6 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105srpt277/pdf/CRPT-
105srpt277.pdf. 
 145. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 146. H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 10. 
 147. Id. 
 148. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 149. H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 11 (“This legislation amends the FCPA to conform it to the 
requirements of and to implement the OECD Convention.”). 
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considered in light of the OECD Convention according to norms for 
implementing legislation.150 
III.  CANONS OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 
Part III applies canons of foreign relations law to elucidate the 
proper boundaries of the FCPA’s application to foreign entities. Part 
III.A examines theories of territoriality and extraterritoriality, by first 
broadly examining the concept of extraterritoriality in international 
law and in the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States. Part III.A also examines the jurisprudence of the 
territorial-effects test and applies recent case law to the FCPA. Part 
III.B examines possible criticisms of the presumption against 
territoriality as applied to the FCPA and defends the application of 
the presumption, and Part III.C explains why two alternative canons 
are inapplicable to the present law. 
A. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
1. An Introduction to Territoriality and Extraterritoriality.  
Problems associated with one nation applying its laws to foreign 
nationals occur frequently in an increasingly globalized world.151 
 
 150. Part III.A.1, infra, discusses this principle in detail and applies the interpretive 
techniques that have developed around treaty-implementing legislation to the FCPA. 
 151. See DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 63, at 325 (“Many of the most difficult and 
controversial international legal disputes arise when states seek to assert authority over persons, 
property, or events abroad. These disputes often involve the extraterritorial application of 
domestic law in ways that harm the interests of other states and at times are contrary to 
international legal limits on the exercise of jurisdiction.”). Perhaps the most famous example of 
the exertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction is the prosecution of Nazi war criminal Adolph 
Eichmann in Israel under a universal-jurisdiction theory. MITSUE INAZUMI, UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 63 (2005). The significant foreign-relations 
and policy implications of sweeping extraterritorial jurisdiction have been widely discussed. See, 
e.g., John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 379 
(2010) (“Avoiding inadvertent international conflicts is an important reason to limit the reach of 
U.S. statutes, as the Supreme Court has recognized since its earliest cases.”); Austen Parrish, 
The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality’s Fifth Business, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1478 (2008) 
(“Academics and courts have unwisely underestimated the problems created by the effects test, 
and with it the problems associated with countries applying their law beyond their borders.”); 
Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, supra note 82, at 1286 (“It is thus not a surprise 
that ‘host country resentment’ and ‘transnational tension and strife’ result when, under the 
FCPA, the United States ‘monitor[s] and seek[s] to control sensitive affairs host countries would 
prefer to govern themselves.’” (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Salbu, supra 
note 91, at 133; and Daniel Patrick Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the 
United States: The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2897, 2928 (2005))). 
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Today, countries frequently seek to regulate, and therefore assert 
jurisdiction over, extraterritorial acts that have effects within the 
country exercising jurisdiction.152 Therefore, this Section more closely 
examines domestic and international law on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. 
There are three types of jurisdiction: jurisdiction to prescribe, 
jurisdiction to adjudicate, and jurisdiction to enforce.153 Under 
international law, a nation has the power to prescribe conduct under 
five principles: (1) territorial jurisdiction or territorial effects; 
(2) nationality; (3) passive-personality jurisdiction; (4) protective 
jurisdiction; and (5) universal jurisdiction.154 The last principle, 
universal jurisdiction, only pertains to egregious or heinous crimes; it 
was first invoked during the Holocaust war crimes tribunals in the 
wake of World War II.155 Nationality jurisdiction, as its name implies, 
rests upon residence or citizenship.156 Passive-personality jurisdiction 
and protective jurisdiction apply to conduct that occurs outside of a 
nation’s territory but that harms or threatens a state’s nationals 
(passive-personality) or a state’s existence or core functions 
(protective).157 
The remaining basis of jurisdiction to prescribe conduct—
territorial jurisdiction—supports, potentially controversially, the 
FCPA’s asserted jurisdiction over parties under § 78dd-3. This basis 
of jurisdiction has also spawned a complicated American 
jurisprudence in an attempt to define a territorial effect sufficient to 
bring foreign conduct under the purview of American law, which is 
presumed to have only territorial application.158 Section 402(1) of the 
Restatement (Third) defines territorial jurisdiction in the following 
manner: 
 
 152. One common example is antitrust, or competition, law. Small, supra note 25, at 283. 
 153. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 63, at 325–26. 
 154. Id. at 332, 346–49. 
 155. Id. at 349. See generally INAZUMI, supra note 151 (examining the concept of universal 
jurisdiction in modern international law, with a special focus on its impact on human rights). 
 156. DUNOFF ET AL., supra note 63, at 346. 
 157. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 402 (1987) (“[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . (2) the 
activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory; and 
(3) certain conduct outside its territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the 
security of the state or against a limited class of other state interests.”). 
 158. William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. REV. 687, 687 (2011). 
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[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to 
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within 
its territory; (b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present 
within its territory; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is 
intended to have substantial effect within its territory.159 
The Restatement (Third) also places certain limits on the 
exercise of jurisdiction, even when one of its aforementioned bases is 
present, through a multifactor balancing test for reasonability that 
examines the regulating state’s link to the activity being regulated, the 
connections between the person responsible and the regulating state, 
the character and importance of the activity being regulated, the 
importance and compatibility of regulation to the international 
system, and the interest of and likelihood of conflict with another 
state in regulating the activity.160 Thus, the Restatement (Third) gives 
some guidance, though no definite rules, on the exercise of 
jurisdiction against a foreign company, such as JGC, for an act that 
occurs in a foreign country but that has at least some territorial nexus 
to the regulating country. The next Subsection, therefore, turns to 
specific Supreme Court precedent on extraterritoriality and territorial 
effects. 
2. Territorial Effects and Extraterritoriality in American Law.  
There is a strong presumption that American laws, including the 
FCPA, do not apply abroad if there is no clear indication of 
congressional intent to do so.161 The Supreme Court has long resisted 
applying American laws to noncitizens for actions taken outside of 
the United States despite Congress’s constitutional authority to 
 
 159. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 402. The Restatement (Third) is considered to be quite authoritative in this field and is cited 
by the Supreme Court in foreign-relations cases. E.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 2285 
n.6, 2290 n.15 (2010); Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 506 n.3 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. 
Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346, 377, 381 (2006). 
 160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) THE OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 403. 
 161. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“When a statute 
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”); EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“We assume that Congress legislates against the 
backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality.”), superseded by statute on other 
grounds, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
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legislate extraterritorially.162 The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
surrounding territoriality and the territorial-effects test has wavered 
between a balancing test similar to that advocated by the 
Restatement (Third) and more categorical modes of analysis, but the 
core hesitance to apply American law to noncitizens and 
nonterritorial conduct has remained.163 This reluctance is particularly 
 
 162. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(“Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally presumed not to 
have exceeded those customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to prescribe.”). 
 163. This footnote provides a brief analysis of the history of extraterritoriality in American 
jurisprudence to demonstrate the resilience of the presumption against extraterritoriality 
throughout the past century and to introduce the key cases and concepts that are discussed 
throughout Part III.A.2. 
  Until the second half of the twentieth century, the United States followed a strict 
territoriality rule; courts applied only domestic legislation to acts that occurred within the 
country. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“But the 
general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be 
determined by the law of the country where it is done.”), overruled by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
Following World War II, the Second Circuit, sitting on a special panel as the nation’s highest 
court, extended the reach of the territorial principle by replacing strict territoriality with a test 
examining the foreign conduct’s effect in the forum state, creating a broader jurisdictional 
reach. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945) 
(“[I]t is settled law . . . that any state may impose liabilities . . . for conduct outside its borders 
that has consequences within its borders which the state reprehends.”). Increasing globalization 
had rendered strict territoriality too restrictive to meet American needs abroad. DUNOFF ET 
AL., supra note 63, at 333. Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), became well established in courts 
as the territorial-effects doctrine, which holds actors liable for extraterritorial actions if three 
conditions are met: (1) Congress intends extraterritorial application; (2) defendants intend their 
actions to produce effects within the United States; and (3) defendants’ actions do produce 
substantial effects within the United States, see, e.g., Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 887 
(5th Cir. 1967) (applying the territorial-effects doctrine). Because lower courts had varying 
interpretations of what establishes substantial effects within the United States, the Ninth Circuit 
attempted to clarify this standard in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A., 
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), superseded by Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 
Pub. L. No. 97-290, tit. IV, 96 Stat. 1246 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6a (2006)), by creating a 
balancing test to weigh domestic and international interests in a manner similar to that which 
was later articulated in the Restatement, see supra notes 159–160 and accompanying text. 
  The next major Supreme Court decision in this area significantly swung the pendulum 
of extraterritorial jurisdiction back toward a more categorical presumption against 
extraterritorial application of American law. Aramco, 499 U.S. at 250–56. The Court, however, 
outlined a different test in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, asking 
whether a “true conflict” between compliance with U.S. law and foreign law exists, id. at 798. 
Although this test appears to be a departure from prior jurisprudence, it still reiterates the key 
presumptions that American laws are territorial in nature and should not be interpreted in a 
way that violates international law. Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A 
New Rule for Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 140 (2010). The 
latest case in this line, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010), 
applies the presumption against extraterritoriality with renewed vigor, see id. at 2877 (“When a 
statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”). The Supreme 
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relevant in criminal law.164 As the Supreme Court clarified in 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank,165 this presumption is 
particularly strong when the intended effects of the illegal action are 
felt outside of the United States.166 
Morrison examined, and rejected, a claim for extraterritorial 
application of another section of the 1934 Act, section 10(b).167 The 
events that led to the suit began when an Australian bank whose 
stock was not traded on U.S. exchanges purchased a Florida 
mortgage-servicing company.168 After the bank wrote down over $2 
billion of the mortgage company’s value, Australians who purchased 
the bank’s shares before the write-down brought suit in U.S. District 
Court in New York, alleging that figures from the mortgage 
company’s valuation models that had been represented in the bank’s 
annual reports constituted manipulative and deceptive practices 
under section 10(b) and its accompanying regulations.169 In rejecting 
the shareholders’ claims, the Court created a more definite rule to 
prevent the judiciary from guessing Congress’s intention in each piece 
of legislation with possible extraterritorial application; after 
Morrison, courts simply apply a presumption against 
extraterritoriality across the board.170 If Congress desires the 
application of a law to conduct abroad, it must specifically state that 
 
Court’s stance in Morrison is much more direct than Hartford Fire’s “true conflicts” test or the 
balancing tests of Timberlane and the Restatement (Third). Morrison, therefore, holds the key 
to analyzing the FCPA’s application abroad. 
 164. See Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436–39 (1932) (holding that a citizen of 
the United States can be held criminally liable for violations of American laws committed 
abroad, but that unless Congress makes clear an intent for the law to apply extraterritorially, a 
criminal statute only applies within the United States); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 
Wheat.) 610, 620, 641–42 (1818) (holding that criminal piracy committed by a foreigner can only 
be tried by the courts of the United States if the piracy is a violation of the law of nations 
because “congress cannot make that piracy which is not piracy by the law of nations, in order to 
give jurisdiction to its own courts over such offences”). 
 165. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 166. Id. at 2883–85. 
 167. Id. at 2875; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006) 
(“It shall be unlawful . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance . . . . ”). The suit in Morrison 
was brought as a private right of action. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876. FCPA cases, by contrast, 
are brought as enforcement actions by the government. 
 168. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875. 
 169. Id. at 2875–76. 
 170. Id. at 2881. 
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in the text.171 Justice Scalia justified the presumption as the only way 
to avoid “[t]he results of judicial-speculation-made-law—divining 
what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation 
before the court.”172 
The FCPA’s regulation of foreign companies, somewhat 
surprisingly due to its international character, fits remarkably well 
into Morrison’s framework for the application of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. First, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is very strong and can only be rebutted by a clear 
indication of congressional intent for extraterritorial application.173 As 
shown in Part II.B, the FCPA’s legislative history indicates, if 
anything, that Congress was reluctant to prescribe conduct for foreign 
entities without a meaningful connection to the United States, rather 
than eager for the broad applicability underlying current enforcement 
practices.174 
Second, and most critically, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality even applies to cases when there are some domestic 
connections.175 There will usually be some aspect of territoriality in 
any FCPA case that attracts DOJ enforcement, but a limited 
territorial connection—such as a wire transfer in which funds pass 
through the United States or an e-mail sent to the United States—
should not be not sufficient to disturb the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Morrison itself proves that the presumption applies 
even in cases with a significant connection to the United States. In 
that case, a company allegedly fraudulently manipulated its financial 
models and made “misleading public statements” in Florida.176 
Because “the focus of the Exchange Act is not upon the place where 
the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of securities in 
the United States,” and the securities in question in Morrison were 
 
 171. See id. at 2881 n.5 (“But when it comes to ‘the scope of [prohibited conduct], the text of 
the statute controls our decision.’” (quoting Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank 
of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994))). 
 172. Id. at 2881. 
 173. See id. at 2878 (“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none.”). For examples of such a clear indication, see supra note 131 and 
accompanying text. 
 174. See supra notes 135–143 and accompanying text. 
 175. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 (“For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial 
application that lacks all contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption 
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its 
kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.”). 
 176. Id. at 2883–84. 
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only being traded abroad, the Court held that the United States 
should decline jurisdiction.177 Although the FCPA is not exactly 
analogous to the 1934 Act, the same “focus analysis” can be applied 
to FCPA cases—the focus of the FCPA is the place of the origin of 
the bribery and the place of the act entailing the crime.178 Territorial 
liability should not be premised upon a mere pass-through or 
tangential connection. 
Third, the presumption against extraterritoriality is a statutory 
canon of construction designed to deal with ambiguity in a U.S. 
statute.179 The division between extraterritoriality and territoriality in 
§ 78dd-3 is deeply ambiguous. As Parts II and III.A have shown, 
there are two plausible constructions of this provision: one which 
offers a near-limitless application to foreign nonissuers’ actions 
abroad or another which offers a constrained application that gives 
meaning to the territorial clause of § 78dd-3. Without the 
presumption, courts would be forced to choose one of these two 
viable alternatives when examining whether any given conduct with a 
minimal territorial connection meets the “while in the territory of the 
United States” requirement. The presumption against 
extraterritoriality, however, makes the choice for the court: the canon 
adds “persuasi[on]” to what was formerly merely one of several 
“plausible” constructions.180 
Fourth, the presumption against extraterritoriality applies 
“regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between the 
American statute and a foreign law.”181 This is particularly important 
in the case of the FCPA, which occupies a field in which there is 
significant foreign legislation and several international treaties.182 If 
 
 177. Id. at 2884. 
 178. The FCPA prohibits particular acts that issuers and their agents may take to obtain 
business. See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (2006) (defining the actus reus of the crime as “mak[ing] use of 
the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an 
offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, 
promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value”); id. § 78dd-2 (same); id. 
§ 78dd-3 (same); see also supra Part I.A. 
 179. Aramco, 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), superseded by statute on other grounds, Civil Rights 
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
the U.S. Code). 
 180. See id. (“We need not choose between these competing interpretations as we would be 
required to do in the absence of the presumption against extraterritorial application . . . . Each is 
plausible, but no more persuasive than that.”). 
 181. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877–78. 
 182. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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international norms on the subject mandated extraterritorial 
application to the broadest extent possible, courts could still apply 
this presumption instead of relying on other canons of foreign 
relations law, such as those considered in Part III.C.183 This aspect of 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is important in its 
application to the FCPA because it provides a simplicity that analysis 
of foreign relations law often lacks.184 
Finally, this approach has two additional benefits. First, it avoids 
a construction of the statute that could have negative foreign-policy 
effects because the presumption against extraterritoriality discourages 
courts from extending American jurisdiction beyond the outer limits 
of what is internationally acceptable.185 This is a logical result because 
avoiding conflict with other nations motivates the presumption 
against extraterritoriality in the first place.186 A powerful presumption 
against extraterritoriality also obviates certain separation-of-powers 
concerns that accompany the nonpolitical branch’s involvement in an 
issue wrought with policy decisions, like international corruption.187 
Because there is a clear rule, the judiciary’s decisions do not appear 
to be made on an ad hoc or inconsistent basis. The second benefit is 
that this approach is in line with recent precedent from the United 
States District Court for the District of Columbia. In 2012, Judge 
Richard Leon acquitted a defendant charged with an FCPA violation 
for want of jurisdiction.188 Judge Leon rejected the DOJ’s argument 
that a United Kingdom citizen who mailed a package from London to 
the United States committed an act that established jurisdiction under 
§ 78dd-3.189 
 
 183. Some scholars would disagree with this statement, but others would embrace the 
courts’ narrow construction of international law without clear congressional intent to apply it 
domestically. See infra note 213 and accompanying text. 
 184. See, e.g., supra Part II and note 163. 
 185. See supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text. 
 186. See, e.g., Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (justifying strict 
territoriality on the grounds that it forestalls conflict with a foreign sovereign), overruled by 
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 187. For an analysis of separation-of-powers concerns in foreign-relations issues, see 
generally Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal 
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997). 
 188. United States v. Goncalves, No. 09-335 (D.D.C. 2012) (granting motion to dismiss). 
 189. See FCPA Summer Review 2011, MILLER CHEVALIER (July 13, 2011), http://
www.millerchevalier.com/Publications/MillerChevalierPublications?find=60408 (“I would think 
the more cautious, conservative interpretation would be that each act has to be while in the 
territory of the United States.” (quoting Judge Leon) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Indictment at 5, United States v. Goncalves, No. 1:09-cr-00335-RJL4 (D.D.C. Apr. 16, 
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B. Rebutting the Critics 
Critics may argue that the international nature of the FCPA 
negates the presumption against extraterritoriality; after all, other 
parts of the FCPA contain an alternative-jurisdiction provision 
specifically providing for extraterritoriality. This argument, however, 
actually strengthens the presumption’s applicability to § 78dd-3, 
which provides for application only “while in the territory of the 
United States.” The absence of an alternative-jurisdiction provision 
coupled with the territorial phrase in § 78dd-3 creates a sharp contrast 
with the other two of the FCPA’s antibribery provisions. Therefore, 
courts should give meaning to Congress’s clear omission.190 In 
Morrison, the Court used a similar line of analysis, juxtaposing 
section 10(b) against section 30(b) of the 1934 Act, a similar provision 
that, unlike section 10(b), does explicitly provide for extraterritorial 
application.191 
Similarly, although the Court justified the presumption against 
extraterritoriality by reasoning that Congress’s primary concern is the 
domestic sphere,192 this statement does not refute the presumption 
against extraterritoriality with regard to the inherently international 
FCPA. First, the presumption that Congress is focused on domestic 
effects is merely a presumption; it is not a mandatory statement of the 
only circumstances in which this canon may apply. The text of 
§ 78dd-3 overcomes an argument that the FCPA is out of the reach of 
the presumption against extraterritoriality by its explicit statement of 
territorial effect. A second, alternative counterargument focuses on 
the legislative history. Congress passed the original FCPA to regulate 
American entities; subsequent amendments were passed to benefit 
American companies, who argued that they were disadvantaged by 
the regulations.193 Even though the FCPA deals with an international 
 
2010) (“[Pankesh Patel] was a citizen of the United Kingdom and, as such, was a ‘person’ other 
than an issuer or a domestic concern as that term was defined in the FCPA.” (quoting 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78dd-3(f)(1) (2006))); id. at 24–25 (alleging that, in violation of the FCPA, Patel mailed a 
package to the United States in connection with the bribery). 
 190. See, e.g., Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) (discussing and applying the canon 
of construction of “negative implications raised by disparate provisions”). 
 191. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882–83; see also Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 30(b), 15 
U.S.C. § 78dd(b) (2006) (“The[se] provisions . . . shall not apply to any person insofar as he 
transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts 
such business in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as 
necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this chapter.”). 
 192. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
 193. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
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problem, it is solidly rooted in the domestic arena, over which 
Congress is presumed to legislate. 
Other critics may cite Pasquantino v. United States,194 a 2005 
Supreme Court case holding that Canadian defendants violated 18 
U.S.C. § 1343, the wire-fraud statute, by making simple phone orders 
from American liquor stores and developing a subsequent plan to 
smuggle the liquor into Canada to avoid paying Canadian taxes.195 
Despite the lack of territorial connection other than the phone call, 
the Court found the defendants liable because the statute criminalizes 
the “scheme” itself, so the criminal act was completed as soon as 
defendants used the telephone to set it up.196 In Morrison, however, 
the Supreme Court distinguished Pasquantino because Pasquantino 
dealt with the wire-fraud statute, which, unlike section 10(b) of the 
1934 Act, was “without any requirement that it be ‘in connection 
with’ any particular transaction or event.”197 The same analysis 
distinguishes a violation under the wire-fraud statute that was at issue 
in Pasquantino from an FCPA violation under § 78dd-3, which is 
predicated on an act occurring “while in the territory of the United 
States.” 
C. Foreign-Relations Alternatives to the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality 
Because the presumption against extraterritoriality is merely one 
of several canons of construction used in foreign relations law, this 
Section examines possible alternatives to the limiting theory posited 
in the previous Section. It begins with the borrowed-treaty rule and 
follows with an examination of the Charming Betsy canon. Both 
subsections first describe the relevant interpretive technique and then 
apply that method to the FCPA’s provisions on territoriality. 
1. The 1998 Amendments as Implementing Legislation.  Foreign-
relations-law scholars explore the interplay between statutory 
interpretation and treaty text, and one scholar has recently developed 
 
 194. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349 (2005). 
 195. Id. at 353–55. 
 196. Id. at 371. 
 197. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2887 (“Section 10(b) by contrast, punishes not all acts of 
deception, but only such acts ‘in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered 
on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.’ Not deception alone, but 
deception with respect to certain purchases or sales is necessary for a violation of the statute.” 
(quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b))). 
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an interpretive framework for legislation that, like the FCPA’s 1998 
amendments, incorporates treaty provisions.198 The so-called 
“borrowed treaty rule” suggests that “the court’s interpretation of an 
incorporative statute should always be consistent with its 
interpretation of the source treaty text unless there is compelling 
evidence that Congress, in enacting the statute, intended to deviate 
from the rule set forth in the treaty.”199 Though the term “borrowed 
treaty rule” is a scholarly creation, the Supreme Court has frequently 
used this interpretive technique.200 Although the 1998 FCPA 
amendments—as implementing legislation of the OECD 
Convention—seemingly fit well within this foreign-relations-law 
mechanism, examining the OECD Convention yields no more 
information than this Note’s prior examination of the legislative 
history of the FCPA amendments on the scope of the FCPA’s 
exterterritorial application. 
The FCPA and the OECD Convention fit well into the 
framework of the borrowed-treaty rule for three reasons. First, the 
legislative history indicates on multiple occasions that the FCPA 
amendments are implementing legislation for the OECD 
Convention.201 Second, the 1998 amendments directly mirror the text 
of the treaty, which had in turn used the FCPA as a template.202 Third, 
the legislative history from 1998 pulls understandings directly from 
the official commentaries to the OECD Convention that explain the 
 
 198. See John F. Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 655, 663 (2010) (“The goal of this Article is to develop a framework that provides a more 
robust and comprehensive understanding of those statutes that incorporate language and 
concepts derived from treaties to which the United States is a party.”). 
 199. Id. at 669–70 (emphasis omitted). 
 200. See, e.g., Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 534–37 
(1995) (interpreting section 3(8) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 1300–
1315 (1994), in line with the Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating 
to Bills of Lading (Hague Rules), Aug. 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, on which the American statute 
was modeled); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–41 (1987) (construing the term “well-
founded fear” in the statutory definition of a refugee in accordance with Article 1(2) of the 
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, done Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 
606 U.N.T.S. 267, to which the United States was a signatory). But see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 
407, 427–28 (1984) (finding no ambiguity in a questioned term in section 243(h) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (1976), and thus refusing to turn to 
a relevant treaty on the subject). 
 201. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 1, 2, 3–6 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
CRPT-105srpt277/pdf/CRPT-105srpt277.pdf. 
 202. See supra Part I.A.3. 
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meaning of certain OECD Convention provisions.203 Given the 
strength of the connection between the 1998 amendments and the 
OECD Convention, it is logical to use the OECD Convention to 
interpret the amendments’ ambiguities. Furthermore, the context of 
the jurisdictional amendments suggests that they fall within the 
borrowed-treaty framework.204 
Although on a theoretical level the OECD Convention should 
shed light on the DOJ’s prosecution of foreign companies for foreign 
bribery, it actually does not add relevant information to the domestic 
legislative history. Article 4(1)’s territorial standard—that signatories 
must criminalize offenses “committed in whole or in part in its 
territory”205—provides no more guidance than the ambiguous 
provision in 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3. It is silent on the borderline cases, 
such as that of JGC, that involve a simple transfer of funds or 
electronic messages through a particular territory. 
The OECD Convention’s Commentaries provide some 
clarification: “The territorial basis for jurisdiction should be 
interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the 
bribery act is not required.”206 This explanation again does not add 
insight beyond the contradictory legislative history of the FCPA, 
which provides an identical statement: “Congress intends that the 
‘territorial basis for jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so that 
 
 203. H.R. REP. NO. 105-802, at 22 (1998), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
105hrpt802/pdf/CRPT-105hrpt802.pdf (“As envisioned in the OECD the territorial basis for 
jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so that an extensive physical connection to the 
bribery act is not required.” (citing Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 31, cmt. para. 25, 37 I.L.M. at 10)). 
 204. Congress thought of the jurisdictional changes to the FCPA as implementing the 
OECD Convention Article 4(4) requirement that a signatory “shall review whether its current 
basis for jurisdiction is effective in the fight against the bribery of foreign public officials and, if 
it is not, shall take remedial steps.” Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 31, art. 4(4), 37 I.L.M. at 5. 
Specifically, Article 4(1) mandates that a signatory “take such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the offence is 
committed in whole or in part in its territory,” id. art. 4(1), 37 I.L.M. at 5, which formed the 
basis for the addition of 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3, see supra text accompanying note 85. Article 4(2), 
the impetus for the addition of the alternative-jurisdiction provisions that apply to issuers and 
domestic concerns, requires that a signatory nation takes adequate steps to “prosecute its 
nationals for offences committed abroad” if the nation’s laws allow for extraterritorial 
jurisdiction based on the nationality principle. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 31, art. 4(2), 37 I.L.M. at 5. 
 205. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, supra note 31, art. 4(1), 37 I.L.M. at 5. 
 206. Id. cmt. para. 25, 37 I.L.M. at 10. 
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an extensive physical connection to the bribery act is not required.’”207 
The OECD Convention has no official drafting history to provide 
additional guidance on the extent of the territorial connection.208 
Thus, this alternative foreign-relations-law technique falls short of 
offering limiting principles that are provided by the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. 
2. The Charming Betsy Canon.  From the earliest days of the 
nation, the Supreme Court has chosen to interpret American law with 
the presumption that Congress does not intend to violate 
international norms.209 This presumption, dubbed the Charming Betsy 
canon, “became the bedrock for a series of later decisions involving 
international law and judicial construction”210 and continues to be 
influential.211 One of its traditional uses has been to avoid potential 
conflicts between statutes and customary international law, often in 
questions of extraterritorial effects.212 The Charming Betsy canon “is 
relevant to determining the substantive reach of a statute because ‘the 
law of nations’ . . . includes limitations on a nation’s exercise of its 
jurisdiction to prescribe.”213 The canon emerged to safeguard against 
the possible effect of judicial decisions on American foreign policy 
 
 207. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 6 (1998) (quoting Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions, supra note 31, cmt. para. 25, 37 I.L.M. at 
10), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-105srpt277/pdf/CRPT-105srpt277.pdf. 
 208. OECD, OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION: OECD GUIDELINES FOR 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 1 (2011), available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyin
internationalbusiness/anti-briberyconvention/46510795.pdf. 
 209. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to 
affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this 
country.”); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 43 (1801) (“[W]e think with great force, that 
the laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable, so to be construed as to infract the 
common principles and usages of nations, or the general doctrines of national law.”). 
 210. Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legisprudence, 44 
HASTINGS L.J. 185, 213 (1993). 
 211. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004) (“[T]his 
Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the 
sovereign authority of other Nations. . . . This rule of construction reflects principles of 
customary international law—law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily seeks to follow.”); 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[S]tatutes should 
not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or conduct if that regulation would conflict with 
principles of international law.”). 
 212. Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking 
the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L.J. 479, 489 (1998). 
 213. Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 815. 
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due to the sensitive nature of international relations.214 Although 
scholars have argued against its broad use to incorporate 
international norms into American law through the judiciary,215 it 
remains an important interpretive tool in U.S. law.216 
Often, the Charming Betsy canon is used to invoke the norms of 
customary international law.217 International norms against public 
corruption, however, have not yet reached the level of jus cogens or 
customary international law, so treaties form the basis of the 
international law analysis.218 Because the OECD Convention is one of 
the primary treaties against which norms of antibribery laws’ scope 
can be determined, this Subsection looks first to that document. The 
 
 214. See Coyle, supra note 198, at 701 (“Although the [Charming Betsy] Court is not explicit 
on this point, it appears from the decision that the importance of avoiding a conflict between the 
statute and those rights possessed by neutral parties under international law informed the 
Court’s decision to adopt two specific constructions of the Non-Intercourse Act[, Act of Feb. 27, 
1800, ch. 10, 2 Stat. 7].”). 
 215. See id. at 708–09 (“Professor Bradley [argues that] an expansive reading of the 
Charming Betsy canon is undemocratic in that it amounts to ‘a mandate for court-supervised 
incorporation of international law’ and that the canon ‘simply allows courts to avoid unintended 
clashes with international law,’ leaving ‘the ultimate questions of incorporation and 
international law compliance to the U.S. political branches.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Curtis 
A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. 
REV. 529, 546–47 (1999))). Instead of taking an internationalist view, Professor Bradley justifies 
the canon from a separation-of-powers perspective. See Bradley, supra note 212, at 525 (“[T]he 
separation of powers conception views the Charming Betsy canon as a means of both respecting 
the formal constitutional roles of Congress and the President and preserving a proper balance 
and harmonious working relationship among the three branches of the federal government.”). 
 216. Because there is a debate about the extent to which courts employing the Charming 
Betsy canon should seek out international norms to incorporate them into domestic law, this 
Note takes a narrow approach and only examines jurisdictional provisions of the leading 
antibribery treaties. 
 217. See Bradley, supra note 212, at 488–90 (noting that the Charming Betsy canon has been 
used to avoid possible conflicts with treaties as well as “to avoid constructions of statutes that 
would violate customary international law”). 
 218. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 325 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Without 
an analysis of the laws enacted by the various signatories, it is impossible to draw any 
conclusions regarding the practice of states with regard to the issue of the degree of corporate 
liability for violation of international law norms. Indeed, as Professor Bassiouni has observed, 
although ‘contemporary international efforts to deal with organized crime, corruption, and drug 
trafficking’ are moving in the direction of corporate liability ‘these new concepts of corporate 
criminal responsibility have not yet found their way into [customary international law].’” 
(footnote omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST 
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 377 (2d rev. ed. 1999))), aff’d for lack of 
quorum sub nom. Am. Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 128 S. Ct. 2424 (2008); Evan J. Criddle & 
Evan Fox-Decent, A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 331, 333 (2009) 
(noting that although corruption is frowned upon, a norm against corruption is not recognized 
as jus cogens). 
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OECD Convention’s Commentaries contain broad notions of 
territorial application. That is, “an extensive physical connection to 
the bribery act is not required.”219 The OECD Convention’s 
recommendations, however, also contain the significant caveat that a 
signatory should act “in conformity with its jurisdictional and other 
basic legal principles.”220 Given its acquiescence to domestic law, the 
OECD Convention appears to establish neither limitations to a broad 
construction of the FCPA’s territorial section nor positive obligations 
to apply a limited territorial nexus to the questioned provision. 
The other key treaty establishing international norms on 
anticorruption enforcement is the 2003 United Nations Convention 
Against Corruption,221 hailed as “the most widely accepted 
international anti-bribery agreement.”222 This treaty has a specific 
article devoted to the “Protection of Sovereignty,” which explicitly 
states that “[p]arties shall carry out their obligations under this 
Convention in a manner consistent with the principles of sovereign 
equality and territorial integrity of States and that of non-intervention 
in the domestic affairs of other States.”223 Although this article 
“refuses to endorse the kind of extraterritorial prosecutions of foreign 
bribery pursued by the United States,”224 it also provides for broad 
signatory autonomy on issues of jurisdiction in Article 42(6).225 
 
 219. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, supra note 31, cmt. para. 25, 37 I.L.M. at 10. 
 220. Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Pub. Officials in Int’l Bus. 
Transactions, Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 3, in OECD, CONVENTION ON 
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 20, 21 (2011). 
 221. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, opened for signature Dec. 9, 2003, S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 109-6 (2005), 2349 U.N.T.S. 41. Several regional organizations also have 
localized anticorruption conventions. E.g., African Union, Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption, opened for signature July 11, 2003, 43 I.L.M. 5 (2005); Council of 
Europe, Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, done Jan. 27, 1999, Europ. T.S. No. 173; 
Organization of American States, Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, done Mar. 
29, 1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996). 
 222. Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, supra note 82, at 1286. 
 223. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 221, art. 4(1), S. TREATY 
DOC. NO. 109-6 at 26, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 147. 
 224. Developments in the Law—Extraterritoriality, supra note 82, at 1286. 
 225. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, supra note 221, art. 42(6), S. 
TREATY DOC. NO. 109-6 at 43, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 164 (“Without prejudice to norms of general 
international law, this Convention shall not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction 
established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law.”). 
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Therefore, it is not evident that adoption of expansive jurisdictional 
reach would explicitly violate the OECD Convention. 
The undefined scope of the phrase “in the territory” contained in 
the various conventions coupled with their general deference to 
domestic law preclude the use of the Charming Betsy canon to 
determining the scope of the FCPA’s extraterritorial application.226 It 
only applies when an ambiguous U.S. statute, such as 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78dd-3, can be interpreted as either conforming with or deviating 
from established international law. Here, the international norms 
contain the same ambiguity as the FCPA itself. Thus, much like the 
possibility of interpreting the FCPA in light of the OECD 
Convention, the Charming Betsy canon does not provide any 
information beyond the traditional interpretive techniques discussed 
in Part II. Therefore, the presumption against extraterritoriality 
appears to be the best limiting principle to curb the current 
application of the FCPA to foreign parties for foreign actions. 
CONCLUSION 
FCPA enforcement actions have expanded in number, size, and 
scope, and prosecutorial decisions have directed enforcement actions 
at an expanded range of violators, including foreign individuals and 
foreign companies that do not issue stock on American exchanges. 
These developments have led to many cases, such as the prosecution 
of JGC, which illustrate the same phenomenon: expansive 
jurisdictional theories that push the statute’s text and history to its 
outermost limits. Because deferred-prosecution agreements are so 
prevalent, courts have not ruled on the propriety—or legality—of the 
DOJ’s expansive theories of jurisdiction arising from vicarious 
liability and merely tangential territorial connections. Therefore, this 
Note tests these broad prosecutorial theories against a range of 
interpretive techniques. 
In the end, the strengthened, post-Morrison presumption against 
extraterritoriality defines the ambiguity in the FCPA’s text regarding 
 
 226. A broader application of the Charming Betsy canon to incorporate customary 
international law could be used to advocate a more limited jurisdictional theory in relation to 
territorial acts of foreign parties. This Note’s goal, however, is to propose a framework for 
interpreting the FCPA rather than to broadly comment on the scope of the Charming Betsy 
canon. Because the narrower presumption against extraterritoriality resolves the FCPA’s 
ambiguity, see supra Part III.A.2, this Note does not broadly consider customary international-
law norms. 
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territoriality and provides a limiting principle for the scope of the 
FCPA. This Note, therefore, urges the application of foreign-
relations-law canons of construction, such as those used here, to settle 
questions regarding the application of American law abroad and limit 
expansive corporate crime statutes’ extraterritorial effects. Although 
the presumption against extraterritoriality is best applied to the 
FCPA’s provisions, another foreign-relations canon may provide the 
answer for a different U.S. statute. 
